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The informal sector accounts for a very large share in African economies, both in terms of GDP and 
employment. However, most national surveys on the informal sector focus on labor market 
issues and informal employment rather than the structure of informal businesses. And sample 
designs are shaped by a narrow and in our view misleading definition of informality as small 
scale individual or household firms. In this study, we use firm-level data collected on 900 
formal and informal businesses in the capital cities of Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal. The 
information obtained from these surveys was complemented by more qualitative information 
gathered from semi- structured interviews of major stakeholders in the three cities as well as 
secondary data compiled from the national income accounts. Our study documents huge 
enforcement problems leading to the emergence of large informal actors coexisting with 
smaller informal businesses. In addition, we found an important difference in productivity 
level between formal and informal firms in favour the former. We also show, however, that 
the productivity gap is much smaller for large informal firms than for small informal firms, 
again suggesting that large informal firms have the requisites to formalize but choose not to 
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It is common knowledge that the informal sector plays a central role in African economies, 
accounting for a large share of GDP and an even greater share of employment. Some key 
sectors of these economies are totally or partially under the control of the informal sector, 
notably commerce, handicrafts, transportation, agriculture, and most of manufacturing.  
Despite its importance, systematic studies of the informal sector in Africa are lacking and 
some important dimensions are not well understood.  In particular, much of the literature 
ignores the major role played by what we call the “large informal” sector:  firms with sales 
that rival those of formal sector firms yet which operate in ways that are quite similar to small 
informal operators. Our study is distinctive in distinguishing between three categories of 
actors: formal firms, small informal firms, and large informal firms.   
 
There have been few previous systematic data collection efforts that focus on informal firms 
in Africa and those that do exist are not very comparable across countries. This is in part 
because most national surveys on the informal sector focus on the labor market and informal 
employment rather than the structure of informal businesses. Furthermore, sample designs are 
shaped by a narrow and in our view misleading definition of informality as small scale 
individual or household firms as defined in UN SNA (SNA, 1993), ignoring the “large 
informal” sector. 
 
In this study, we use firm-level data collected on 900 formal and informal businesses in the 
capital cities of Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal. The information obtained from these 
surveys was complemented by more qualitative information gathered from semi- structured 
interviews of major stakeholders in the three cities as well as secondary data compiled from 
the national income accounts. The initial 900 interviews in the three cities were conducted in 
2007.  A second phase of more in-depth interviews with selected major stakeholders focusing 
on the large informal sector was carried out in 2009. 
 
The predominance of the informal sector in Africa, and the existence of large informal firms 
in particular, highlight some major issues inhibiting African development.  Despite its 
importance the informal sector only contributes 3 percent of tax collections. The large 
informal enterprises choose to remain in the ambit of the informal sector, even though they 
meet all the criteria for formal status. The existence of these firms is a clear manifestation of 
state failures in Africa:  corruption, the governments’ weak enforcement capabilities, and 
adverse business environments, all of which increase the costs and reduce the benefits of 
operating formally. High taxes and onerous regulations on formal firms make formalization 
unappealing while corruption and lack of enforcement enable politically well-connected and 
influential actors to operate informally with impunity. 
 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the relationship between informality and 
productivity. Previous studies of developing countries have found that informal businesses are 
less productive than formal ones (see for example Perry et al. 2009; Gelb et al. 2009); West 
Africa is no exception, as we extensively document in this paper. We show, however, that the 
productivity gap is much smaller for large informal firms than for small informal firms, again 
suggesting that large informal firms have the requisites to formalize but choose not to do so.   
 
The remainder of the document is organized as follows: the second section reviews the 
significance of informality in West Africa. In a third section, our definition of informality as a 
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continuum against the more standard binary formal/informal opposition is spelled out. The 
fourth section documents the existence of large informal businesses in West Africa. The fifth 
section discusses the relationship between informality and the business environment. The 
sixth section reports findings on the relationship between informality and productivity. A 
short concluding section follows. 
 
 
II. The informal sector in West African economies: scope and major characteristics 
 
The informal sector, however defined, occupies an important position in African economies, 
as practically every study of the subject agrees. According to Schneider and Enste (2002), the 
informal sector represents 10 to 20 percent of GDP in developed countries and more than a 
third of GDP in developing countries. The ILO reports that the informal sector accounts for 
48 percent of non-agricultural employment in northern Africa, 51 percent in Latin America, 
65 percent in Asia, and 72 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chen (2001) estimates that 93 
percent of new jobs created in African during the 1990s were created by the informal sector. 
Xaba et al. (2002) find that, while formal sector employment and output are stagnant at best, 
informal sector employment and share in GDP are steadily increasing. Focusing on the rural 
economy, Otsuka and Yamano (2006) report a non farm informal income share of 13 percent 
in Ethiopia, 30 percent in Kenya and 38 percent in Uganda. Steel and Snodgrass (2008) report 
that the informal economy accounts for 50 to 80 percent of GDP in Africa and as much as 90 
percent of employment. Estimates show that the informal sector accounts for three quarters of 
Ghana’s total income; in rural areas, this proportion reaches 90 percent (Canagarah and 
Mazumdar 1999). In Burkina Faso, 80 percent of total employment is attributed to the 
informal sector (Calves and Schoumaker 2004).  
 
Some of the largest and fastest growing sectors of West African economies are informal: 
transportation, hospitality, reproduction of musical CDs and tapes, carpentry, construction, 
real estate, and especially retail and wholesale trade (Adams 2008; Lund and Skinner 2004; 
Haan 2006). Verick (2006) finds that the retail sector is the largest locus of informal activities. 
Similarly, Charmes (1993) found that 80.7 percent of businesses in Benin’s urban zones were 
street vendors. According to a 1988 USAID survey (USAID, 1988), 72 percent of informal 
activity in Senegal involves trade. The average size of informal business is 1.1 workers per 
firm, i.e., one employee per firm (ILO 1995). The results from the second phase of the 1.2.3 
survey (DPS, 2004), show that size of informal activity has increased but remains a very low 
1.5 employees per firm.  The 1-2-3 survey also found that 46.5 percent of informal activity is 
in agriculture, while industry accounts for 30.6 percent, services for 21.3 percent, and 1.6 
percent is attributed to fishing.  These studies, however, defined informality as small firms, 
and therefore ignored the large informal operators. 
 
 
III.  Informality as a Continuum 
 
There are a number of possible definitions of informality and various studies have adopted 
different concepts. Consequently, estimates of the informal sector’s magnitude vary greatly  
depending on the chosen definition (Verick 2006). The most commonly-used criteria are: the 
size of the business; registration with the government; and maintenance of honest and 
complete accounts. Kanbur (2009) rightly argues that any researcher studying the informal 
sector should begin by defining informality. In this section we review the main criteria for 
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informality and show that each captures a part of the phenomenon.  We then suggest that a 
composite definition is more appropriate. 
 
The size of activity criterion 
 
Informal firms are often identified as having a small number of employees. The ILO’s 
approach (ILO 2002), which defines an informal firm as an unregistered firm with no clear 
line separating business activities and household activities, has been widely used. A further 
qualifier is a lack of honest accounting statements. The only firms that fit these criteria are 
family enterprises, classified as household enterprises in the United Nations’ system of 
accounts (SNA 1993). According to this definition, the informal sector encompasses small 
enterprises that employ fewer than ten employees and that are not registered with a given 
administration. There are several ambiguities associated with this definition: a) The ILO sets 
the recommended upper limit for number of employees at ten but individual countries have 
leeway to set a different upper limit in their statistical definition of informal firms. Certain 
countries choose an upper limit of 5 employees, whereas others chose either lower or higher 
limits; b) Countries are also able to choose whether to include agriculture in informal 
activities, along with unpaid domestic labour, individuals with a second job in the informal 
sector, rural areas, minimum age, etc. Consequently, data on the informal sector is collected in 
various ways and international comparisons are difficult.  
 
Equally important, this definition excludes the large informal firms that are an important 
segment of the informal sector.  While it is certainly true that the vast majority of informal 
firms in the countries that we are studying are small-scale or even miniscule enterprises, the 
large informal firms account for a substantial share of informal sector output.  
 
 
The registration criterion 
 
Another commonly used criterion for defining informality is registration with a government 
agency.  A problem here is that there are multiple government agencies overseeing the private 
sector (central or local administration, tax authorities, or others), and firms may register with 
some but not others. Gelb et al. (2009) focused on registration with the tax authorities.  On 
this basis they distinguish between three types of enterprises: formal micro-enterprises (5 or 
fewer employees), formal small enterprises (5 to 10 employees), and informal micro-
enterprises (fewer than 5 employees). Note that this approach shows a further problem with 
the size criterion: small and micro-enterprises can be formal. Indeed, among the seven 
countries that the authors studied, the proportion of formal firms varied between a minimum 
of 28 percent in Namibia and in Kenya, and a maximum of 54 percent in Uganda. La Porta 
and Shleifer (2008) also make use of the registration criterion. According to them, a 
distinction should be made between two categories of informal firms: those that fail to register 
with the police, tax authorities, and other regulators, and those that are registered but 
understate revenues. They therefore observe that the registration criterion alone is not 
sufficient to qualify a firm as formal.  
 
In our view, when studying francophone African countries, the registration definition 
generally better captures informality than does the firm size criterion. Nevertheless, the 
registration criterion poses serious operational problems when applied to West African 
countries, for the reason noted above: data compilation on informal firms in these countries is 
handled by agencies that often use different identifiers. Many firms are registered with some 
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agencies but not others. The street hawker who has no trading permit, but who is indexed in 
the records of municipal services, might be classified as formal! One could use registration 
with one particular government agency, e.g., the tax authorities, as the criterion for being 
formal. However, many clearly informal firms are registered with the fiscal authorities. 
Indeed, there are two types of fiscal regimes in WAEMU countries using the OHADA legal 
system4
 
: regular business income tax and presumptive lump-sum tax. The first regime 
requires reliable financial statements that enable calculation of taxable income based on 
accurate reporting of profits or sales; the second regime is based on tax officials’ estimates of 
the firm’s revenue and expenditures based on partial information, and a lump-sum tax is 
levied. Thus, in WAEMU countries the important distinction is not whether or not firms are 
registered with the fiscal authorities but rather what type of tax they are subject to. 
The existence of honest financial statements criterion 
 
The lack of accurate and complete books is also a fundamental distinguishing feature of 
informality. Indeed, a characteristic of the informal sector is absence of transparency. The 
majority of informal firms in West Africa lack regular and up to date books which makes  
monitoring and taxation of these firms very difficult.  In practice, however, this definition is 
not easy to implement. How does one decide which types of financial statements to use and 
whether or not they are accurate?  Normally, the statements required by tax authorities and the 
statistical agency would be considered relevant. However, in UEMOA countries this 
definition is inadequate. In fact, the financial statements required even of formal firms differ, 
with large enterprises reporting to the Division des Grandes Entreprises (DGE) in the 
Treasury5
 
. Firms filing with the DGE have to provide more detailed financial statements than 
do small enterprises. More importantly, many enterprises, especially the large informal 
operators, are highly skilled at producing false financial statements. These firms are aided by 
accounting firms that specialize in producing misleading accounting certificates. Many 
informal actors admitted anonymously to us that they retain several versions of their accounts: 
one for themselves, one for loan requests from a bank, one for tax authorities, etc. Each 
version is created with a specific use in mind, and these firms have no trouble getting them all 
certified by accounting firms complicit in this elaborate hoax. Accurate accounting is 
therefore very difficult to determine. However, for want of a better alternative, we include this 
criterion in our study as one component of a composite definition, classifying all firms that 
are either not taxed at all or taxed on a lump-sum basis as being informal, and firms that are 
taxed on a regular business income tax basis as being formal. 
The mobility of workplace criterion 
 
In West Africa many informal activities are highly mobile and without a fixed workplace. 
This applies not only to travelling salesmen and street hawkers, but also mechanics, 
carpenters, and small business owners. In general, these actors do not own or rent their 
workplaces. Instead, they occupy unused spaces and vacate when the space is needed by its 
owner. Given this situation, some researchers identify the informal sector with a lack of fixed 
workplace. While it is true that many informal firms are highly mobile, many more informal 
                                                 
4 Organisation pour l’harmonisation des droits des affaires en Afrique is a regional setting empowered to design 
rules and regulations applicable to businesses, which all UEMOA country members have adhered to. 
5 Division des grandes enterprises. This is the tax division to which big firms, with a turnover exceeding a given 
threshold (about CFA 1 billion) have to file to. 
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firms do have a fixed workplace, so this criterion identifies only a limited part of the informal 
sector. 
 
The access to bank credit criterion 
 
Limited access to credit is also a characteristic of informality. Bank credit is largely an option 
only for the formal sector while most small enterprises are confined to informal loans from 
friends, family, or tontines, which all generally demand high interest rates (Johnson 2004; 
Akoten et al. 2006). La Porta and Schleifer (2008) argue that informal actors’ limited access 
to credit can be explained by their relatively low level of education. The criterion of access to 
bank credit is very relevant to African countries. Banks demand a number of financial and 
administrative documents before even examining loan applications. It is practically 
impossible for informal actors to assemble the required documents.  Nevertheless, this 
criterion too has its limitations because many formal firms are also credit-constrained in 
Africa.  This is because lack of documentation is not the only constraint to obtaining credit. 
Collateral requirements are also a major impediment; even some large firms are discouraged 
from obtaining bank credit due to onerous collateral requirements as well as general reticence 
of banks to lend to all but the largest and best-known businesses. There are many formal 
enterprises, notably SMEs, which finance their investments with internal funds or through 
informal financing with high, even exorbitant, interest rates. The access to bank credit 
criterion, just like all preceding criteria, is relevant to informality but with limitations. 
 
Our approach to defining informality 
 
All the above criteria have some degree of validity suggesting that informality is better 
described as a continuum defined by a combination of the above criteria. As Steel and 
Snodgrass (2008) note, “…There is a continuum of different degrees of formality (in terms of 
different characteristics such as nature of registration, payment of taxes, management 
structure, contractual arrangements with employees, market orientation, etc.” The multi-
criteria approach was also used by Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur (2006), who, when defining 
informal employment, gave prominence to the absence of social security coverage; rights to 
vacation; written contracts; low levels of revenue; lack of affiliation to a workers’ 
organization; unstable work conditions; and the illegal or quasi-illegal nature of the firm’s 
activity. Although our focus is on informal businesses and not informal employment, we 
retain many of the same criteria. Informality in the sub-region is a very complex reality that 
varies enormously among different economic actors. Very few firms fit all the criteria of 
formality.  Therefore, we have distinguished between several levels of informality. 
-- At the bottom of the ladder, there are those firms that are completely informal—
firms that do not fulfill any of the criteria defining formality. These firms are 
completely unknown to fiscal authorities and all other administrations. They are small, 
do not have access to bank credit, are not subject to the regular business income tax, 
and are itinerant. These firms are at level 0 of informality. 
-- The second level consists of those actors who fulfill at least one of the criteria 
defining formality. This level includes mainly those who are registered with an 
administration dealing with enterprises; who have more than 5 employees (or who 
have sales of over 50 million CFA francs); or, finally, who have gained access to bank 
credit within the previous 5 years. These actors are at level 1 of informality. 
--At the third level, there are those actors that fulfill at least two of the five criteria 
defining formality; at the fourth level there are those that fulfill three of the five 
criteria, and so on. 
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--The last level consist of formal firms who fulfill all five criteria of formality. These 
firms are registered with at least one administration, employ more than five people or 
have sales of over 50 million CFA francs, are taxed through the regular business 
income tax, had access to bank credit within the past five months, and have a fixed 
domicile.  
 
Figure 1 : The above categories provide six levels of informality in increasing order, with 
only a small proportion of firms that meet all of the criteria of the strict definition of formality. 
 
Figure 2  Share of firms satisfying various criteria of informality  
 
 
IV.  Large informal businesses in West Africa 
 
As mentioned earlier, a striking characteristic of West African informal sectors is the presence 
of large actors that fulfill all the criteria for formality, but choose to stay in the informal sector. 
The presence of this category of actors has been noted by other but rarely described and 
analyzed in depth.  For example, Jacobs (World Bank 2004) proposes a transition program 
that allows firms near the margin to accede to the benefits of formality while taking on the 
obligations gradually over time, but, referring to a West Africa case, he warns: 
 
It should be clarified that the transition program for informal enterprises is not meant 
to apply to those large-scale enterprises, particularly in the importing sector, that 
evade taxes. These enterprises have no need for any special benefits. They exist only 
with the tacit agreement of powerful supporters in the government, and their existence 
should be considered a costly form of corruption rather than a special case for a 
developing economy. To remedy this problem, the government needs to launch a 
program to enforce the tax and the other laws against these enterprises. 
 
Large informal firms are defined as those firms that pay the presumptive lump-sum tax while  
having revenues above 20 million CFA francs per year (about $40,000).  Large informal firms 
are found in a variety of sectors in West Africa, including transport, industry, wholesale and 
retail sectors, music distribution, etc.  Data was obtained from different sources for formal, 
large informal and small informal firms: for formal enterprises by consolidating files from 
statistical services and fiscal services; for large informal enterprises from the fiscal services 
file; for small informal enterprises from the 1.2.3 sample in each country, restricted to those 
enterprises whose revenues are below 20 million CFA francs per year. 
 
The analysis of the results of our interviews reveals some similarities, but many important 
differences, between the large and small informal sectors. Many large informal firms do not 
see themselves as informal; they are even offended at the suggestion that they might be 
lumped into that category. In truth, they would not be classified as informal if the usual 
criteria are applied mechanically. They appear, superficially, to meet most of the criteria 
defining formality: they pay taxes; some even are taxed under the regular business tax regime; 
their tax filings are handled by the DGE (the division that handles filings for large formal 
firms mentioned above); have a high level of sales; have access to bank credit, etc. But a 
closer examination reveals that their practices are in fact informal. Even though these firms 
are large as measured by sales, their administrative structures are weak and resemble those of 
small informal firms. Formal firms of the same size have distinct departments and a coherent 
organizational structure, but informal firms do not. In fact, apart from the owner and a few 
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permanent employees (rarely more than five), the rest of the personnel are temporary. A 
single individual manages the firm with little assistance from others. Managerial style is 
similar to that of small informal firms. None of the usual departments in formal firms (sales, 
input sourcing, finance, human resources, etc) exist in large informal firms, despite their high 
levels of sales. Even the accounting function is outsourced to an independent firm, while all 
medium-size formal firms have in-house accounting departments. In addition, the accounting 
for these large informal firms is typically highly dishonest, massively underreporting sales 
and profits. The absence of honest accounting is one of the determining features of the 
informal sector, particularly for the large informal sector. 
 
To provide some evidence on the magnitude of under-reporting of sales by the large informal 
sector we carried out a comparison for Senegal of firm-level imports, reported by customs, 
and sales as reported to the tax authorities for those same firms and recorded by the 
government statistical agency.  We selected a number of firms that paid the lump-sum 
presumptive tax (in principle reserved for small informal firms). We considered only 
importing firms with an identification number that allows their declared sales to be traced to 
the fiscal agency. Given that most importing firms do not have an identification number (an 
identifier is surprisingly not a requirement for importing), we were able to match only 132 
firms in the fiscal and customs statistics, a small proportion of the firms that pay the 
presumptive tax. Moreover, we were not able to identify the largest informal operators. Large 
informal firms often have many identification numbers and fragment their imports, making it 
difficult to determine their total imports. Indeed, of the 132 identification numbers whose 
imports and sales we were able to cross-check, it would not be surprising if a good number 
belonged to one individual. 
 
Figure 3: proportion of firms under reporting sales to the tax authority by industry 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis starkly reveals the extent of under-reporting of 
sales, demonstrating that many firms that are subject to a lump sum tax because of their 
under-reporting of sales should actually be subject to regular business taxes. These false 
declarations are facilitated by the lack of cooperation and exchange of data between customs 
and the fiscal agency. The results show enormous gaps between imports and sales figures, 
with imports sometimes 10 times greater than sales. While some imports are for capital goods, 
the discrepancies are much too large to be explained this way, particularly given the largely 
commercial nature of the activities concerned. Among firms in our sample, over 41 percent 
report sales below imports. In certain sectors, like jewelry sales and mechanics, this 
proportion is greater than 50 percent. In the retail sector, 56 percent of firms in our sample 
have a greater value of imports than of sales!   In fact, the discrepancies between imports and 
reported sales may be even larger than Figure 7 suggests, given that imports can also be 
understated by smuggling and underinvoicing.   
 
The government officials we interviewed are well aware of this situation and acknowledged 
that fraud is common. Joint squads of customs and tax agents identify a significant number of 
fraudulent tax filings. When they identify tax evasion, they subject the firms to penalties and 
regular business taxes. Often, however, these firms then declare bankruptcy or simply 
disappear only to reappear under a different name and resume their  practices.  
 
The second phase of our survey, conducted in 2009, focused on large informal firms, largely 
confirms that firms disappear when they are at risk of being discovered, or were discovered, 
by the fiscal authorities.  Many of the large informal firms identified in the first phase of the 
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survey in 2007 had disappeared by 2009. For example, in Ouagadougou, only 30 percent of 
large informal firms had survived, while for formal businesses the survival rate was 98 
percent. This low survival rate of firms in the large informal sector is somewhat misleading, 
however, as firms often closed and reappeared in a different form. 
 
Although actors in large informal sector have access to bank credit, many of them continue to 
make use of personal funds, or funds from their families or other personal relations. However, 
this use of personal savings is a matter of choice rather than a necessity—these firms have all 
the necessary documents required by banks for loans. Most of these documents are, of course, 
fraudulent; but this would not be an impediment to access bank credit. These firms generally 
eschew bank credit due to the onerous conditions of this credit and also because the resulting 
increased transparency of their business income could increase exposure to the tax authorities. 
 
The fragility of large informal firms’ distinguishes them from their formal counterparts. 
Although proof is difficult, it is well known that these firms are engaged in fraudulent 
activities. Also, their longevity is strongly linked to that of their owners; most firms 
disintegrate after the death of the proprietor. Often, those who inherit the firm cannot come to 
an agreement on how to operate the firm and it collapses. In other cases, a dramatic scandal 
leads to the imprisonment of the owner of the firm. This has occurred in Senegal for several 
large informal actors, including Cheikh Tall Dioum, Adel Korban, Khadim Bousso, 
Moustapha Tall, (See Benjamin and Mbaye, 2010 for more details). In other cases, conflicts 
with customs or with suppliers or creditors lead to the demise of the firm. Large informal 
firms are like a giant with a clay foot. On the one hand, these firms operate on a large scale 
comparable to that of firms in the formal sector. On the other hand, a simple disagreement 
with a customs official can put an end to activities. These firms endanger themselves by 
operating in the same manner as small informal firms, yet they have much greater visibility. 
There is a constant battle between these firms and the fiscal authorities.  Often these firms 
benefit from political or religious connections, but this support itself can also be fragile and is 
not unlimited. As soon as firms lose their political or marabout support, or are entangled in 
incriminating public scandals, or cannot resolve a disagreement with customs, imprisonment 
or the disappearance of the firm usually follows. Customs is particularly powerful in West 
African countries, providing a major part of government revenues and also a locus of 
corruption; when a conflict with customs officials arises, even well-connected informal actors 




V. The Informal Sector and the Institutional Environment 
 
As noted earlier, firms opt for informal sector status in response to the perceived benefits and 
costs of formalization. In Africa, it is quite clear the spread of the informal sector is fostered 
by state failures, such as: the length and complexity of the registration procedures, the failures 
of the judicial system, the weaknesses of structures responsible for collecting and delivering 
support services to small businesses (including those of the informal sector), and the ability of 
large influential players to circumvent the rules, often with the state’s compliance, etc.  These 
state failures interact with cultural traditions in West Africa to create an environment 
conducive to informalization. For example, in Senegal, much of the informal sector is 
connected to powerful Islamic religious groups, notably the Mourides.  In this section, we 




a. The business climate 
 
The quality of public services (infrastructure, judiciary) affects the choices of firms insofar as 
one of the benefits of formal sector status is greater access to these services; if these services 
are of poor quality what is the point of being formal?  Likewise if formal sector status requires 
compliance with onerous regulations and high taxes, informal sector status is more appealing. 
Most studies on obstacles to investment confirm that countries in the sub-region experience a 
more adverse business environment than do other developing countries (see rankings from the 
World Economic Forum’s World Competitiveness Report and the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Indicators). Countries in West Africa are generally ranked well below those of the 
other developing countries.  Steel and Snodgrass (2008) conclude that in the African context, 
getting registered and becoming formal are not advantageous for informal firms.   
 
Our findings largely confirm the results of these surveys, but with certain nuanced differences. 
Few enterprises saw registration as an obstacle. Of all the enterprises included in the second 
phase of our study, which focused on formal and large informal firms, only 12 percent had 
encountered obstacles in registering. Enterprises did, however, cite many other inadequacies 
in public services.  
 
The state’s failings in establishing credible policies to promote private-sector development 
become obvious when heads of enterprises are asked about their taxation. Two thirds believe 
that the state does not make good use of tax revenue, and this proportion rises to 88 percent 
among medium-sized firms (enterprises with sales of between 50 and 100 million FCFA). 
Furthermore, 69 percent of respondents believe that the state uses public funds unethically. 
This proportion rises to almost 100 percent among medium size firms. Most firms also claim 
that the state imposes excessive tax burdens on firms, leading to tax evasion. Many also agree 
that they are exposed to even greater hassles if they formalize their firms. Among all 
respondents in Senegal, 52 percent found that paying taxes exposes a firm to greater tax 
hassles; 59 percent of large enterprises share this view.  
 
A Senegalese tax agent explained the problem to us this way: “Informal actors are expensive 
in terms of the research that we need to carry out to tax them.” Indeed, the fiscal 
administrations of the three countries seem to be of the opinion that the cost of obtaining 
information on informal firms outweighs the benefit of the increased revenues that would 
result. Consequently they focus their efforts on the firms they can easily identify, and from 
which they can collect the full amount of taxes due; in other words, formal actors. It is 
obvious that this strategy, while understandable given the limited resources of the fiscal 
authorities, creates important distortions. Most new business with the capacity to be formal 
choose to seek refuge in the informal sector. In addition, existing formal firms are tempted to 
migrate towards the informal sector to escape from fiscal hassles. 
 
Most respondents have a negative view of the level of taxes and of the management of tax 
collections. The majority thought that fiscal pressure was very high (60 percent of all firms 
and 67 percent of large informal firms). In addition, 46 percent of respondents reported long 
queues that made tax payment more difficult; 20 percent find it hard to declare taxes and 42 
percent found the management of the collection service to be poor. 
 
The state’s shortcomings in the application of laws and regulations also become evident when 
respondents are asked about regulations relating to the informal sector. In Senegal, for 
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example, 68 percent of interviewees find that the state does not adequately enforce regulations 
concerning workers’ social security; the same proportion found inadequate verification of 
honesty in revenue declarations and accounting. This high perception of lack of government 
enforcement capabilities is one of the most important determinants of informality. 
 
 
b. Corruption and difficulties in regulating large, influential actors 
 
Corruption and failure to enforce rules and regulations are also major determinants of 
informality.  The corruption that exists in all rungs of society contributes to the flourishing of 
large informal actors. Often, they are well connected politically, which offers them some 
impunity. Court decisions are frequently challenged, and the press often reports corruption 
scandals in the courts. Large informal actors are supported by a chain of collusion that 
involves customs, the administration, and the courts. A customs authority from one of the 
countries we visited confided to us that, “When we arrest a person for fraud, we quickly offer 
him a deal and do our best to ensure that the case does not get to the tribunal or to the police; 
once there, one is never sure what the outcome will be.” 
 
Some large informal firms also rely on Islamic brotherhoods for support. Cross-border trade 
between Senegal and The Gambia offers a good illustration. This trade has long been 
dominated by well-identified social and religious groups, such as: the ‘baol baol’—traders 
from the Mouride brotherhood—, Guineans, and Mauritians. Gambian importers of food 
products (tomatoes, rice, tea, etc.) are linked to intermediate wholesalers who dominate the 
distribution chain. The chain operates out of the Gambian urban centers of Banjul, Bakau, 
Serekunda and Bassé, distributing imported products to shopkeepers installed along the 
Senegalese border, where Senegalese smugglers go to stock up. Gambian importers also sell 
directly to Senegalese traders, who come to Banjul or to Bassé with 35 ton trucks. Border 
crossings of the goods can occur in two ways: either the truck is unloaded in a border 
warehouse to allow small quantities of goods to be smuggled into Senegal, or the truck is 
allowed to enter Senegal with the collusion of Senegalese customs agents. The Mouride 
brotherhood plays an important role in this process. Mouridisme is based on clientelistic 
relations that connect these business networks. The Mouride disciple proves his allegiance 
and submission to his marabout (religious leader) by serving him in several ways, including 
cultivating his land and offerings in kind and in cash. In return, the marabout offers protection 
by intervening on behalf of disciples with the authorities, and through provision of an 
informal social safety net and financial network. This allows Mouride traders from the 
Senegalese cities of Prokhane and Kaolack to openly engage in smuggling products from The 
Gambia.  Before the privatization of peanut parastatal SONACOS and the dissolution of its 
affiliate SONAGRAINES, registered traders who gathered peanuts for SONACOS would use 
the advances intended for peanut cultivation to instead finance sugar, rice, and tomato 
concentrate imports from The Gambia. Collusion between the Senegalese state and heads of 
the Mourides has been well documented (see Golub and Mbaye, 2009). Notables in the 
Mouride brotherhood receive special favors from the state. In 1986, after the partial 
deregulation of rice imports, with 25 percent of the market allocated to private enterprises; 
one of the largest transporters benefiting from the clientelistic allocation of market shares was 
none other than the personal secretary to the Caliph of the Mourides.  
 
 





A large literature shows that there is a strong negative correlation between informality and 
productivity of firms in developing countries.   Steel and Snodgrass (2008) find that the 
productivity differential between the two categories of firms is due mainly to unequal access 
to public services. Gelb et al (2009) compare the productivity of formal firms and informal 
firms using surveys on the investment climate for a number of countries of southern and 
eastern Africa.  Their results  confirm that formal sector firms are on average more productive 
than informal ones but the  gap between formal and informal firms is much less for east 
African countries than for southern African countries.    They attribute this to the difference in 
the quality of the quality of the business environment and the enforcement of rules.  The 
relative weakness of the state in East Africa undermines the performance of formal firms, 
thereby lowering the gap between formal and formal firm productivity.  La Porta and 
Schleifer (2006) also find that the productivity level of informal sector firms is much less 
important than that of formal sector firms.  Their preferred explanation is differential access to 
inputs (including human capital) and the difference in production scale.  All these studies, 
however, do not consider large informal firms.  
 
To compare productivity levels between the formal and informal sectors, we compute two 
alternative measures of productivity with our survey data: labor productivity and total factor 
productivity (Harrigan 1996, Mbaye 2003, Mbaye and Golub 2003).  Labor productivity (LP) 









= , where Q is value added and L is the number of employees for firm i 
In order to measure total factor productivity (TFP), we use the Cobb-Douglas production 
function: , where K is capital stock and α and β are the respective shares of 
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Under the usual assumption of constant returns to scale we have α + β = 1. TFP can be 
estimated using a log-linear version of the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
1.3.  εβα +++= LogKLogLALogQ  
 
Total factor productivity is computed as the constant term in Equation 1.3.  Equation 1.3 was 
run separately for each of the three subgroups in our sample (formal, large informal, and small 
informal sectors).  This provides measures of average TFP for the various firms in the three 
categories, assuming that the production functions for the individual firms are of the Cobb-
Douglas type with constant returns to scale. Alternatively, equation 1.2 can be used to 
evaluate TFP at the firm level, without requiring the assumption of common production 
functions. 
 































































Recall that β represents the capital share of income.
  
Equation 1.4 indicates that labor productivity is a function of TFP and capital intensity, while 
1.5 shows the same relationship in rates in change. A rise in capital intensity will lead to a rise 
in LP, holding A constant. These equations suggest that productivity differentials between 
sectors could be due either to efficiency/technological differences (A) or differences in 
capital-labor ratios.  Differences in capital-labor ratios could in turn reflect differential access 
to financing between formal and informal firms, or between large and small firms.  Our 
results indicate that productivity differences between formal and informal firms reflect 
differences in both efficiency and capital intensity. 
 
Equations 1.1 through 1.5 are estimated using data collected from 900 firms in three West 
African capital cities (300 in each city): Cotonou, Dakar, and Ouagadougou. 6
 
  We compute 
productivity both by degrees of informality and for the three groups of firms: formal 
enterprises, and large and small informal enterprises (as defined in section IV, page 7 above).   
Our results confirm a significant productivity gap between the formal and informal sectors of 
the three cities, but the gap is much smaller for the large informal sector. Labor productivity is 
higher on average in formal firms than it is in the large informal firms, which in turn have 
higher labor productivity than small informal firms. Figure 4 displays boxplots showing the 
distribution of productivity levels by degrees of informality. Productivity gaps are found to be 
more pronounced in Ouagadougou. This particularly large discrepancy in Ougadougou is 
likely to be related to firms’ perception of the business environment, which is considerably 
better in Burkina Faso. Whether one considers access to basic social services, the amount of 
time necessary to obtain access to these services, or average duration of service disruptions, 
the results of our survey indicate that the situation on Ouagadougou is far more favorable than 
those of the other cities. This lends credence to the hypothesis proposed by Gelb et al. (2009) 
that the two most important determinants of the productivity differential between the formal 
and informal sectors are the quality of the business environment, and the ability of the state to 
establish and enforce laws and regulations.  
 
Formal firms account for the bulk of firms with the highest labor productivity levels, whereas 
informal firms constitute a large majority of firms with low productivity. For example, in the 
case of Senegal, among the companies with a productivity level between 100 million and 300 
million CFA francs CFA francs per worker, 77 percent are in the formal sector, with 23 
percent and 0 percent in the large and small informal sectors respectively. Conversely, among 
the firms with productivity levels below 5 million CFA francs, only 13 percent are in the 
formal sector, while 7 percent are in the large informal and the remaining 80 percent are in the 
                                                 
6 Because most of our regressions are logistic, no simple formula is available to determine which error might 
occur on coefficients in the model, but a rough approximation can be obtained as proportional to   -- (the 
proportionality constant will depend on a number of factors), assuming that the sample is a simple random 
sample of the population (in reality, because we are using stratified sampling, errors will be somewhat less).  
This means that we can see how much improvement can be obtained by increasing the sample size to 400, 500, 
etc in the table below. Improvements to the precision of estimates increase quite slowly with sample size.  This 
consideration plus the fact that a sample size of 300 is practically feasible led us to this choice of sample size. 
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small informal. If we consider a productivity level threshold of 50 million CFA francs, only 8 
percent of all the firms surveyed in Senegal achieve a level of productivity above this 
benchmark, while this is the case for 23 percent, 20 percent, and 0 percent for the formal, 
large informal, and small informal sectors, respectively. 
 
We were also interested in the magnitude of productivity gaps between the three subgroups of 
our sample (formal, large and small informal). As it turns out, productivity differential is 
actually relatively small between the formal and large informal sectors, whereas the gaps 
between either of those subgroups and the small informal are quite pronounced. For example, 
in Senegal, 22 percent of the firms in the formal sector and 21 percent of firms in the large 
informal sector achieve productivity levels superior to 50 million CFA francs, but no firms in 
the small informal sector do so. However, if one looks at higher productivity levels, the 
differences between the formal and large informal sectors are clearer. For example, in Senegal, 
17 percent of formal sector firms have productivity levels which exceed 100 million CFA 
francs, as compared to only 10 percent of firms in the large informal sector.  
 
Figure 5 : Firm distribution according to informality and level of 
productivity in Dakar, Ouaga and Cotonou 
 
These productivity differences are robust to alternative indicators or correlates of informality. 
For example, firms which offer their employees social security coverage (i.e., mainly formal 
firms) have markedly higher productivity than those which do not offer such coverage. Thus, 
among firms with productivity levels below 5 million CFA francs, 76 percent offer no social 
insurance coverage for employees. Conversely, among firms that achieve a productivity level 
superior to CFA 300 millions, 75 percent have a social security coverage, while the remainder 
certainly belonging to the large informal7
  
 does not have it. Access to bank credit is correlated 
with productivity although less so than other factors: among firms with productivity levels 
below 5 million CFA francs, 84 percent had not received bank credit within the past 5 years, 
while for firms with high productivity (between 100 and 300 million CFA francs) the rate 
drops to a still rather-high 62 percent (Figure 5). A firm’s failure to keep systematic and 
accurate accounts is strongly associated with productivity levels: 46 percent of companies 
with low productivity levels (less than 5 million CFA francs) do not keep regularly updated 
accounts, as compared to 92 percent firms with higher productivity levels (100 million – 300 
million CFA francs). The story is similar when we consider formal registration: 100 percent 
of firms with productivity levels exceeding 50 million CFA francs were registered, as 
opposed to 86 percent of firms with productivity levels below 50 million CFA francs (Figure 
3). 
To test the impact of informal status on productivity more fully, a simple OLS regression is 
used. The dependant variable is the log of labor productivity, which is regressed on a variety 
of sets of explanatory variables such as informality, the characteristics of corporate managers, 
the sectors in which the firms operate, as well as their perceptions of the business 
environment and the labor market. Using the stepwise backward procedure, we proceeded to 
eliminate certain variables in order to retain only the most significant. The results obtained 
with our baseline regression are presented in Table 1. Our results indicate that all variables are 
significant with the expected sign. Informality is here considered as a categorical variable 
                                                 




which takes on the values 1, 2, and 3, respectively for the large informal, the formal, and the 
small informal sectors. The formal is considered here to be the reference variable and is 
dropped. The form3 variable which represents the small informal has a negative coefficient 
which is significant at the 1 percent level, while the form2 variable for the large informal 
sector has a positive coefficient significant at the 1 percent level. Other factors involved in 
determining labor productivity are capital intensity (positive and significant at 1 percent) and 
the firm’s industry affiliation.  
 
There are three potential problems, which could bias the results of our regressions: 
a) a careful examination of our data indicates that most variables are not normally 
distributed and many have highly skewed distributions;  
b) a non-linear specifications might yield superior results; 
c) while our descriptive statistics, along with the results obtained from our basic 
regression, indicate a negative correlation between informality and productivity, 
this does not indicate the direction of causation; bidirectional causality between 
these two variables could induce endogeneity bias. 
 
To address questions a) and b), we used the CART method (Classification and Regression 
Trees), a non-parametric relational analysis method. Informal versus formal sector status 
emerges as the variable which best splits labor productivity observations into two distinct 
groups.  This result is valid for all three cities (Cotonou, Dakar, and Ouagadougou), and 
unambiguously indicates the decisive connection between informality and firm productivity. 
Moreover, the CART analysis allocates the large informal and formal sectors together into 
one homogenous group, while the small informal is placed into a separate group. The gap in 
the average log productivity between the grouped formal and large informal sectors relative to 
the small informal is 2.09, 1.93, and 2.89 for Dakar, Cotonou, and Ouagadougou respectively.    
 
In addition to informal sector classification, other factors also affect labor productivity 
according to the CART analysis, namely industry in which the firm operates, firm size, and 
capital intensity. These findings are quite consistent with the findings from our regressions 
and the descriptive statistics. However, there seemed to be strong correlations between certain 
explanatory variables, particularly industry and size. We therefore interacted these two 
variables in a second model, the results of which are presented in Table 2. This new 
specification improved the results while confirming the main findings. Capital intensity is still 
significant at 1 percent, with the expected positive sign. The coefficient on form3, which 
represents the small informal sector, remains significant at 1 percent with negative sign. 
Industry classification is also significant, most notably affiliation with trade and service 
sectors.  The R-squared statistic also improved. In order to address whether or not the 
existence of a bidirectional relationship could cause residuals to be correlated with 
explanatory variables, most econometrics textbooks recommend the use of estimation with 
instrumental variables. However, we refrained from searching for appropriate instruments in 
view of recent research which casts doubt on the validity of instrumental variable procedures 




In this paper we have reported on research on the informal sector in West Africa, using survey 
data from Benin, Burkina Faso and Senegal. The sampling strategy we have used in this study 
differs significantly from those used in most other studies which are often based on a narrow 
definition of informality focusing on size as the major distinctive feature of informality. We 
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have instead relied on an approach to informality which combines a spectrum of criteria 
identifying informal firms. These survey data are used along with other qualitative data 
gathered from semi-structured interviews and secondary data from the national income 
accounts. One major novelty of our study is the inclusion of large informal firms which 
coexists with the more well-known small informal firms. Large informal operators often 
operate thanks to political connections and rely on bribery, corruption, and fraud in an 
environment where the business climate is adverse and state enforcement of regulations is 
very weak.  
 
A particular focus of this study is the relationship between informality and productivity.  Our 
results confirm the heterogeneity of the informal sector.  Specifically, they confirm the 
importance of distinguishing between the large and the small informal firms in describing 
behavior and identifying obstacles in the investment climate. The productivity gap between 
formal and informal firms is found to be important for small informal businesses but much 
less so for large informal ones.  
 
Policy recommendations differ for dealing with large and small informal enterprises. The 
informal sector is a symptom of institutional deficiencies, and the prevalence of large 
informal firms, in particular, reflects government failure to enforce regulations, as well as the 
burdensome nature of regulations and taxation that inhibit compliance. For these large 
informal firms for which formalization is feasible, regulations and taxation should be more 
systematically applied and enforced.  For smaller informal firms, improvements in support 
services and easing of burdensome regulations are in order. Governments should 




Figure 1: Informality as a continuum : the six different levels of formality 


























































Figure 5: Firm distribution according to informality and level of 




Table 1 : Estimation of productivity equation (lprod) 
Lprod Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
Capital labor 
ratio 0,096 0,027 3,550 0,000 0,043 0,149 
services 0,463 0,218 2,130 0,034 0,035 0,891 
trade 0,836 0,220 3,790 0,000 0,402 1,270 
buildings 0,709 0,425 1,670 0,097 -0,128 1,546 
Legal structure 0,606 0,340 1,780 0,076 -0,064 1,275 
Small informal -1,401 0,239 -5,860 0,000 -1,872 -0,930 
Big informal  0,658 0,295 2,230 0,027 0,077 1,239 
_cons 13,054 0,521 25,050 0,000 12,028 14,080 




Table 2 : Estimation of productivity equation making sector and formality status 
variables interact 
Lprod Coef. Std.Err T P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
Capital labor ratio 0,100 0,027 3,720 0,000 0,047 0,153 
Small 
informal*financial 
services 2,362 1,401 1,690 0,093 -0,395 5,119 
buildings 0,706 0,423 1,670 0,096 -0,126 1,538 
Big 
informal*commerce -1,298 0,594 -2,190 0,030 -2,468 -0,129 
Small informal -1,090 0,278 -3,920 0,000 -1,638 -0,543 
Small 
informal*commerce -1,056 0,471 -2,240 0,026 -1,984 -0,129 
Big informal 1,086 0,364 2,990 0,003 0,371 1,802 
services 0,499 0,216 2,310 0,022 0,073 0,925 
Legal structure 0,761 0,342 2,220 0,027 0,087 1,434 
commerce 1,788 0,440 4,070 0,000 0,922 2,654 
_cons 12,694 0,530 23,930 0,000 11,650 13,738 
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